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ANTITRUST IN NEED: UNDERGRADUATE FINANCIAL AID
AND UNITED STATES v. BROWN UNIVERSITY
THEODORE J STACHTIARIS
INTRODUCTION
On December 22, 1993, following the Third Circuit's decision to re-
mand the case to the district court,' the Justice Department and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") agreed to settle a bitter
thirty-month antitrust suit.2 Many academic observers applauded the
settlement as a significant victory for MIT.3 As MIT President Charles
M. Vest said, the settlement represents "a way to allow principle to out-
weigh narrow, overly technical readings of the law."4 Unfortunately,
however, a technical reading of the law by the Third Circuit will stand as
precedent, potentially affecting future antitrust litigation.'
The litigation began on May 22, 1991, when the Justice Department
1. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993).
2. See Matthew Brelis, MIT, US Resolve Suit on Aid Data, Boston Globe, Dec. 23,
1993, at 21. Under the settlement, in exchange for dismissal of the suit, MIT agreed to I)
award financial aid solely on the basis of financial need; 2) meet to discuss common meth-
ods to determine need; 3) exchange, through a third party, financial data on individual
families to insure its consistency; and 4) admit students on the basis of merit without
consideration of ability to pay tuition. See id MIT further agreed not to discuss individ-
ual student awards, prospective tuition, or faculty salaries. See id. The Ivy League
schools, see infra note 6, originally defendants with MIT in this action, settled the case
previously. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. The Justice Department, how-
ever, agreed to include the schools in the later settlement reached with MIT. See Brelis,
supra, at 21.
3. See William H. Honan, M.L T. Wins Right to Share Financial Aid Data in Anti-
trust Accord, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1993, at A13.
4. ML T. Reaches Settlement in Lawsuit on Financial Aid, Harv. U. Gazette, Jan. 7,
1994, at 1.
5. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). The law under
which this case was brought, Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), in-
cludes a private right of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). A settlement, usually called a
"consent decree," does not affect individuals not party to the decree. See, e.g., Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("Of course, a consent judgment, even one
entered at the behest of the Antitrust Division, does not immunize the defendant from
liability for actions, including those contemplated by the decree, that violate the rights of
nonparties."). Thus, private individuals may still bring suit against MIT and the other
parties to the consent decree. One action has been brought by a recent graduate of Wes-
leyan University. See Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 142 F.R.D. 597, 603, (S.D.N.Y.
1992). MIT, however, was not named as a defendant in the suit. See id. at 597. The
plaintiff's motion for class certification has been denied for failure to satisfy the adequacy
of counsel requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). See id at 603. Furthermore, the
decision in United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993), may well affect
the treatment of educational institutions and other nonprofit organizations in future anti-
trust litigation.
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charged the eight Ivy League schools 6 and MIT with agreeing to form a
"collegiate cartel" to fix financial aid packages in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act.7 The Justice Department argued that the
purpose of the agreement was to eliminate competition for students and
effectively raise the cost of a degree to those students.8 The Ivy League
schools immediately settled the case through a consent decree, 9 agreeing
to cease sharing financial aid information."° MIT, however, decided to
defend its financial aid practices."
The Justice Department challenged the colleges' well-established fi-
nancial aid policies. 2 Since the 1950's, financial aid officials from
twenty-three prestigious northeastern colleges 3 have gathered to share
financial information about jointly admitted students who applied for fi-
nancial aid.' 4 The self-named "overlap group"'15 sought to eliminate
6. The eight Ivy League schools are Brown University, Columbia University, Cor-
nell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.
7. See Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., No 'Collegiate Cartel" Wash. Post, May 27, 1991, at
A23 (describing the action as "perhaps the most overbearing move against private higher
education in the nation's history"). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent
part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
8. See Anthony DePalma, Price-Fixing or Charity? Trial of MIT Begins, N.Y.
Times, June 26, 1992, at A17. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department alleged
that the Ivy League and MIT unlawfully conspired to restrain trade by (1) agreeing to
award financial aid exclusively on the basis of need; (2) agreeing to implement a common
formula to calculate need; and (3) collectively setting each commonly admitted students'
family contribution toward the price of tuition. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d
658, 663-64 (3d Cir. 1993).
9. Consent decrees are a major part of the Justice Department Antitrust Division's
enforcement program. A consent decree is a settlement whereby the defendant agrees to
refrain from certain practices deemed illegal by the government and the government en-
tity agrees to drop its suit. See Black's Law Dictionary 410-11 (6th ed. 1990).
10. See Anthony DePalma, Ivy Universities Deny Price-Fixing But Agree to Avoid It in
the Future, N.Y. Times, May 23, 1991, at Al; Yoder, supra note 7, at A23. The Ivy
League universities agreed to end their policy of basing all aid decisions solely on need
and to cease agreeing on uniform aid awards for students admitted to more than one Ivy
League school. See DePalma, supra, at Al.
11. See Yoder, supra note 7, at A23.
12. See Anthony DePalma, In Trial, MIL T to Defend Trading Student-Aid Data,
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1992, at A17.
13. The participahts include the Ivy League colleges, see supra note 6, MIT, Amherst
College, Barnard College, Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr College, Colby College, Middle-
bury College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith College, Trinity College, Tufts University,
Vassar College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, and Williams College. See Su-
san Chira, 23 Colleges Won't Pool Fiscal Data, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1991, at B7. The
Justice Department charged only the Ivy League schools and MIT. See Roger Parloff,
Conceptual Combat, Am. Law., Nov. 1992, at 78, 79-80.
14. See DePalma, supra note 12, at A17.
15. The name of the association originated from the idea that when an applicant has
been accepted at more than one of the member schools, part of the applicant pool has
overlapped. See Mary C. Cage, Justice Department Widens Probe of Tuition and Student
Aid to 40 Colleges, Chron. Higher Educ., Sept. 20, 1989, at A19.
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competition for students based on financial aid awards by offering pack-
ages founded solely on financial need. 6 In furtherance of this goal, they
set up a formula for determining need and established uniform aid
awards for students admitted to two or more member schools."
MIT argued that the purpose of the overlap agreement is to insure
fairness in distributing financial aid.' By awarding aid only to students
who need it, the overlap colleges can "spread their money further" than
if they awarded aid based on academic or other merit. 9 In an analysis
submitted to the district court, University of Chicago economist Dennis
W. Carlton supported the overlap agreement: "The effect of the overlap
meetings was not to raise price as is typically associated with price fixing,
but rather to transfer dollars primarily from students with higher-income
parents who would otherwise receive non-need-based aid to other
students."'2
Chief Judge Louis Bechtle of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dis-
agreed. The Chief Judge accepted the Justice Department's argument
that the overlap agreement's purpose was to raise the cost of education at
the overlap colleges. 2 ' The Judge, therefore, invalidated the overlap
group's practice of sharing information as a violation of the Sherman
Act.22 One year later, however, Judge Cowen of the Third Circuit re-
versed Chief Judge Bechtle's decision, remanding the case for reconsider-
ation.23 The Third Circuit directed the district court to consider the pro-
competitive and non-economic justifications of the overlap agreement, in
order to determine if the Sherman Act was violated.24
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits agreements "in restraint of
trade or commerce."2 The statute was written in very broad terms, leav-
ing the judiciary to shape its limits.26 The courts have developed three
levels of scrutiny for analyzing an alleged Sherman Act violation.2'
First, some agreements are considered illegal per se, for history and expe-
rience have shown them to be "plainly anticompetitive."28 Such viola-
tions are subject to a conclusive presumption of illegality. 29 Second, the
16. See DePalma, supra note 12, at A17. For a review of the terms of the overlap




20. Ia (emphasis omitted).
21. See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rey'd, 5
F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
22. See id
23. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993).
24. See id. at 678.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
26. See infra part I.A.
27. For a more detailed discussion of the three standards, see infra part I.B.
28. See e.g., National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) (discussing the nature of per se illegality).
29. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911) (asserting that
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"quick look" mode of analysis, an intermediate standard, presumes com-
petitive harm, and thus forces the defendant to assert some competitive
justifications for the restraint.3" Finally, the "rule of reason" standard
places the initial burden on the plaintiff to establish that the agreement
unduly restrains trade or commerce. 31 The burden then shifts to the de-
fense to proffer a sufficient pro-competitive objective.32
The district court decided the case based on the quick look standard.3
The Third Circuit, however, noted the "nature" of higher education and
the asserted pro-competitive and pro-consumer features of the overlap
agreement. It, therefore, ordered the district court to investigate "more
fully... the procompetitive and noneconomic justifications proffered by
MIT," and thus apply the traditional rule of reason standard.34
MIT's victory, however, was only partial. Though the college was
given a better opportunity to argue its justifications, the Third Circuit
agreed with the district court in holding that the gratuitous offering of
financial assistance to incoming students was a "commercial transac-
tion," not a charitable act, and thus within the purview of the Sherman
Act.35 The Third Circuit, however, in equating the setting of tuition
rates to the setting of financial aid packages,36 took an unnecessarily
wooden view of the financial aid practices of the overlap colleges and
failed to consider thoroughly the legislative and judicial history of the
Sherman Act.
This Note argues that financial aid distribution is a charitable act not
governed by the Sherman Act. Part I of this Note discusses the history
of and legal standards promulgated under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Part II examines the historical treatment of nonprofit organizations
under the Sherman Act, setting forth a two-part scheme for analyzing
potential antitrust violations. Part III evaluates the relationship between
the overlap agreement and commerce under the Sherman Act. Part III
concludes that financial aid is not commerce, and thus the overlap agree-
ment does not violate the Sherman Act. Part IV examines the per se,
quick look, and rule of reason standards, in the event that courts con-
sider financial aid to be commerce, and determines that courts should
the fixing of rates among competitors is subject to a "conclusive presumption of
invalidity").
30. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107-10 (1984) (discussing the
quick look standard).
31. See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)
(setting forth a "classic" statement on the rule of reason). For the statement in full, see
infra note 60.
32. See id.
33. See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (placing
the burden on MIT to justify its actions), rev'd, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
34. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993).
35. See id. at 668.
36. The court said, "The amount of financial aid not only impacts, but directly deter-
mines the amount that a needy student must pay to receive an education at MIT. The
financial aid therefore is part of the commercial process of setting tuition." Id. at 666.
1748 [Vol. 62
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apply the rule of reason standard. Finally, this Note concludes that the
overlap agreement is not a Sherman Act violation: first, it is not com-
merce under the Sherman Act, and second, regardless of the analysis of
commerce under the Act, the overlap agreement passes the rule of reason
standard.
I. SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Background
The Sherman Act of 1890"7 was originally enacted to protect consum-
ers from manipulation and control by large trusts and combinations dur-
ing the late nineteenth century.3" Section I of the Act provides in
pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."' 9 Con-
gress wrote the statute in very broad terms, leaving a great deal for judi-
cial interpretation.' Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes described the
Act as a "charter of freedom" which possesses "generality and adaptabil-
ity comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions."41
The very breadth of the condemnation, however, has given rise to
great ambiguity in application.42 Consequently, Chief Justice Edward D.
White endeavored to limit its scope. In Standard Oil v. United States,43
the Chief Justice effectively amended the statute. No longer were all re-
straints of trade illegal. Rather, only those agreements which "unduly"
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
38. See eg., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940) ("[The Sher-
man Act] was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and of 'combinations' of businesses and of
capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in
the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a
matter of public concern."); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959) (concurring in the Apex court's recognition that the Sherman Act is aimed primar-
ily at combinations having "commercial objectives"); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911) (pointing out that the Act was passed out of a fear of vast accumu-
lations of wealth and the oppressive power which often accompanies it).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
40. See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 63 (1977). One
commentator points out that "legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended
courts to shape the Act's broad mandate." See Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges
and Tuition Price-Fixing: An Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L, 271, 275 (1991) (citing
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)). In one
of the Supreme Court's early Sherman Act decisions, the Court wrestled with the con-
struction and scope of the statute. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 326-27 (1897) (applying the Sherman Act to an agreement among railway
companies).
41. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
42. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at § 63 (discussing the development of the rule of
reason and per se doctrine).
43. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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restrain trade or commerce were prohibited.44 Pointing to the common
law background on which the statute was based, the Chief Justice said,
"The statute ... evidenced the intent not to restrain the right to make
and enforce contracts . . . which did not unduly restrain interstate or
foreign commerce, but to protect that commerce from being restrained
by methods.., which would constitute an interference that is an undue
restraint. '
4 5
In order to prove an offense under Section 1, the plaintiff/prosecutor,46
therefore, must establish three elements: 1) that a contract, combination
or conspiracy between at least two entities existed; 2) that the conspiracy
created a restraint on interstate trade or commerce; and 3) that the re-
straint was unreasonable. 47 The existence of a conspiracy is a factual
question. The statute, however, does not define a "restraint of interstate
trade or commerce," nor does it suggest what makes a restraint unrea-
sonable. As a result, the judiciary is left to define the boundaries of a
restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act.48
B. The Standards
The determination of the reasonableness of a restraint of interstate
trade or commerce often engenders great debate.49 In order to aid in this
determination, the courts have fashioned three standards.
1. The Per Se Approach
The per se doctrine states that arrangements which have a "direct and
immediate effect ... upon interstate commerce" are presumptively inva-
lid.5 o The per se rule condemns practices which have been shown
44. See id. at 60. The Chief Justice's opinion developed into what is now called the
rule of reason. For a discussion of the rule of reason standard, see infra part I.B.3.
45. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 60.
46. Actions under the Sherman Act may be brought by the United States government
or by private individuals. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). Often private action follows a suc-
cessful government proceeding. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 483 (1968) (shoe manufacturer sues lessor of shoe manufacturing
machinery following successful government prosecution of lessor).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 233 (1947) (holding that
the transportation of interstate travelers by taxi cab from their homes to the railroad
station is not interstate commerce under the Sherman Act); Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 241 (1918) (holding that an agreement prohibiting members
of a trade board from purchasing or offering to purchase grain between sessions of the
board at a price other than the closing bid did not unduly restrain trade).
48. See Roger D. Blair & Carolyn D. Schafer, Antitrust Law and Evolutionary Models
of Legal Change, 40 U. Fla. L. Rev. 379, 386 (1988).
49. The reasonableness requirement, in fact, cannot be found within the letter of the
statute. The statute, by its terms, prohibits all restraints of trade. Virtually every con-
tract, however, restrains trade to some extent. Thus, over the years, courts have decided
that only activities which unduly restrain trade are prohibited by the Sherman Act. See
supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
50. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). The Supreme
Court later defined the per se rule as focusing on "whether the practice facially appears to
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
1750 [Vol. 62
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through experience to be so highly suspect that a violation is presumed."'
For example, horizontal price-fixing, an agreement to fix prices between
or among independent entities which compete on the same level in the
distribution of products or services, generally is a per se violation. 52 The
courts have held that it is in "nature," "character," and "necessary ef-
fect" adverse to competition and, therefore, generally subject to a conclu-
sive presumption of invalidity.53 Essentially, the per se rule condemns
agreements which "because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable."54
2. The "Quick Look" Approach
The "quick look" is an intermediate standard employed in cases where
the per se standard does not apply, but where the "anticompetitive conse-
quences" of the activity are apparent.55 Under the quick look approach,
competitive harm is presumed. Unlike the per se standard, however, the
quick look gives the defendant the opportunity to present competitive
justifications for the restraint.56 If no legitimate justifications are offered,
the court condemns the practice "without ado." '57 If the defendant offers
sound justifications, then the court applies the full-scale "rule of reason"
analysis.5
output." Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979).
51. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(1978) ("[A]greements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive
that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality ... are
'illegalperse.' "); United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("It is only
after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them
as per se violations of the Sherman Act.").
52. A horizontal agreement to fix prices is considered the "archetypal example" of a
per se violation. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980); accord
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1982); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927).
53. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). In fact, horizontal price-
fixing was the first category of business conduct to which courts officially applied the per
se rule. See Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 396-98 (expressing the per se rule); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 216 (1940) (employing the term "per se"
for the first time).
54. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); accord NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) ("Per se rules are invoked when surround-
ing circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render
unjustified further examination of the challenged conduct."); Maricopa County, 457 U.S.
at 344 ("Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict
with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive pre-
sumption that the restraint is unreasonable.").
55. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106.
56. See iL at 110.
57. See Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n,
961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 409 (1992).
58. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d Cir. 1993).
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3. The Rule of Reason Approach
In contrast to the inflexible per se approach, the "rule of reason" per-
mits the courts to determine whether conduct is "significantly and un-
reasonably" anticompetitive in character or effect.5 9 Early on, courts
realized that "[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains."'  Thus, the rule logically condemns only those activi-
ties which unduly restrain trade.6' In situations where per se and quick
look condemnation is inappropriate, courts fully examine the activity at
issue to determine whether the agreement promoted or restricted
competition.62
59. See Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 11 (1955) [hereinafter, Attorney General's Report]. The Supreme Court stated in
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933):
The restrictions the Act imposes are not mechanical or artificial. Its general
phrases, interpreted to attain its fundamental objects, set up the essential stan-
dard of reasonableness. They call for vigilance in the detection and frustration
of all efforts unduly to restrain the free course of interstate commerce, but they
do not seek to establish a mere delusive liberty either by making impossible the
normal and fair expansion of that commerce or the adoption of reasonable
measures to protect it from injurious and destructive practices and to promote
competition upon a sound basis.
Id. at 360.
60. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Chicago
Board of Trade recites the classic statement of the rule of reason which is routinely
quoted in jury instructions:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple
a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business ... ; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of in-
tent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id.
In National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), Justice
Stevens discussed Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade. See id. at 687-88.
Justice Stevens wrote, "[o]ne problem presented by the language of § I of the Sherman
Act is that it cannot mean what it says. The statute says that 'every' contract that re-
strains trade is unlawful. But, as Mr. Justice Brandeis perceptively noted, restraint is the
very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of private
contract law." Id. See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
342-43 (1982) (discussing the evolution of the rule of reason).
61. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); see also Attorney
General's Report, supra note 59, at 11 ("While Standard Oil gave the courts discretion in
interpreting the word 'every' in Section 1, such discretion is confined to consideration of
whether in each case the conduct being reviewed under the Act constitutes an undue
restraint of competitive conditions .... ").
62. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), clarified a point of ambiguity on
the rule of reason: noncommercial goals of an agreement should not be considered. See
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The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the activity at
issue may "suppress or even destroy competition." 63 If the plaintiff
meets this standard, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
activity promotes a sufficiently "pro-competitive" objective." To mount
a successful rebuttal, the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the restraint is
not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective."65
II. NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMERCE UNDER THE
SHERMAN ACT
Since nonprofit organizations, by definition, do not aim to increase the
wealth of their members, it would appear that they would not engage in
price-fixing or other Section 1 restraints of trade.66 Though they do not
seek personal profits, however, nonprofit organizations may nonetheless
intentionally restrain commerce. For example, the Supreme Court found
that a nonprofit foundation that established maximum fees for doctors
participating in a health insurance plan constituted an illegal price-fixing
arrangement.67 The analysis should focus not on the nonprofit character
of the organization, but rather, on the nature of the activity at issue.
A. Case History
The Supreme Court has suggested that antitrust laws should not apply
to noncommercial entities.6" In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,69 members
of a labor union,70 in an attempt to unionize a hosiery factory, forcibly
took possession of a plant.71 During this "sit-down" strike, union mem-
bers damaged or destroyed machines, resulting in the complete suspen-
id at 104. The court must focus solely on the issue of whether the agreement promotes
or restricts competition. See id.
63. Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238; accord Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at
691.
64. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993).
65. Ido (citations omitted).
66. Senator Sherman did not envision the application of the Sherman Act to nonprofit
organizations. In response to a proposed addition to the Sherman Act to include an
exception for "temperance societies," Senator Sherman remarked, "I do not see any rea-
son for putting in temperance societies any more than churches or school-houses or any
other kind of moral or educational associations that may be organized. Such an associa-
tion is not in any sense a combination or arrangement made to interfere with interstate
commerce." 21 Cong. Rec. 2658 (1890).
67. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1982).
68. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
69. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
70. The treatment of labor unions in antitrust law has a confused history. Section 6
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988), for example, states that labor is not an article
of commerce and that antitrust laws should not forbid labor organizations. Nonetheless,
as the Apex court noted, labor unions are not wholly exempt from antitrust law. See
Apex, 310 U.S. at 487-88. For an interesting discussion of labor and antitrust law in a
modem context, see Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming the Bench: The Nonstatutory
Labor Exemption in the National Football League, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 1203 (1993) (dis-
cussing the history of the nonstatutory labor exemption).
71. See Apex, 310 U.S. at 482.
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sion of business.72 The union did not seek to increase profits by affecting
market price, but rather attempted to compel the company to accede to
its demands.73 The Court extensively examined the legislative history of
the Sherman Act74 to determine whether the Act prohibited the union's
activity. 75 The Supreme Court held that the union's activities did not
violate the Sherman Act because the union did not intend to affect the
prices of hosiery.76
More recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, clearly hold
that nonprofit organizations are not categorically exempt from the Sher-
man Act.77 For example, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar7 the Fairfax
County Bar Association, a nonprofit organization, prescribed a mini-
mum-fee schedule for legal services relating to residential real estate
transactions. 79 The Virginia State Bar, exercising its administrative
agency powers, enforced the schedule.8 0 The Court rejected the County
Bar's argument that "learned professions" are not regulated by the Sher-
man Act, noting that the public service aspect of a professional service is
not controlling."' The Court held that the fee schedule promoted by the
bar association set prices for the purpose of eliminating competition
among lawyers.8 2 Thus, disregarding the nonprofit character of the asso-
ciation, the Court found that the activities of the bar association violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 3
Despite Goldfarb's denunciation of a Sherman Act exemption for pro-
fessional associations, the Court did not totally discount the nature of an
organization from the analysis:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that par-
ticular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
72. See id.
73. See id. at 502.
74. See id. at 489-501. The Court stated: "In consequence of the vagueness of [the
Sherman Act's] language, perhaps not uncalculated, the courts have been left to give
content to the statute, and in the performance of that function it is appropriate that
courts should interpret its word in the light of its legislative history and of the particular
evils at which the legislation was aimed." Id. at 489 (citations omitted).
75. See id. at 490.
76. See id. at 501-02.
77. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984) ("There is no
doubt that the sweeping language of § I applies to nonprofit entities.").
78. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
79. See id. at 776-78.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 787 (citing United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S.
485, 489 (1950)); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1986)
(holding that a dental association rule forbidding members to submit x-rays to dental
insurers in connection with claim forms constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 681 (1978) (holding that an association of professional engineers' canon of ethics
prohibiting competitive bidding by its members violated the Sherman Act).
82. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 782-83.
83. See id. at 788.
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view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust con-
cepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular prac-
tice, which could be properly viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act
in another context, be treated differently.8
Thus, though the nonprofit nature of an organization does not warrant a
categorical exemption, it does play a major role in the analysis.
Consequently, charitable and social welfare organizations generally are
not considered commerce under the Sherman Act unless the challenged
conduct is plainly engaged in for the purpose of revenue enhancement.85
This caveat is evident in the apparent distinction between business
leagues, whose object quite often is increasing revenues, and charitable or
social welfare organizations, which generally do not promote the private
gain of their members.8 6 The significance of this dichotomy should not
be overstated, however. While it is clear why business leagues often im-
plicate the Sherman Act, it does not necessarily follow that charity or
social welfare organizations do not. The type of organization alone offers
little to the analysis. 87 Rather, the question must focus on the nature of
the activity at issue.
B. Examining the Nature of the Activity: Effect Versus Intent
In examining the nature of the activity at issue, some courts focus on
the effect of the activity," while others emphasize the intent of the ac-
tor's conduct as well.8 9 The distinction is obviously vital: many activi-
84. Id at 788 n.17. The Court went on to stress, "We intimate no view on any other
situation than the one with which we are confronted today." Id.
85. See Mark D. Selwyn, Note, Higher Education Under Fire: The New Target of
Antitrust, 26 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 117, 142 (1992).
86. See id at 142-44 (comparing FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411 (1990) (refusing an exemption for a group of lawyers who boycotted indigent
defense work as a way of increasing compensation) with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,
458 U.S. 886 (1982) (permitting a civil rights boycott of white-owned businesses as a way
of highlighting racial discrimination of local merchants)).
87. The nature of an association, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
88. See, eg., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975) (discounting
legal association's stated goal of providing services necessary to the community); United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610-11 (1972) (discrediting defendant's intent to
foster competition with larger supermarket chains); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (rejecting defendant's contention that they had an "honest and sin-
cere" intent to recognize and exercise the rights belonging to the defendant under its
patents).
89. See, eg., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512-13 (1940) (holding that a
labor union strike did not implicate commerce under the Sherman Act since the suspen-
sion of business was not intended to affect commerce); NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612,
622-23 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that pro-life protests directed against abortion clinics do
not implicate commerce under the Sherman Act because they are not intended to create a
monopoly for any one provider); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Sch., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (requiring "coin-
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ties affect commerce though the actors did not intend to do so. An
additional requirement of intent significantly burdens prosecutors/
plaintiffs.
For example, in Marijorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,90 the D.C. Circuit Court's intent
requirement thwarted the plaintiff's cause of action.9 In Marjorie Web-
ster, a nonprofit organization, the "MSA," accredited qualified colleges
in an effort to improve higher education.92 The MSA refused to accredit
Marjorie Webster Junior College because it was not "a nonprofit organi-
zation with a governing board representing the public interest. 93
Marjorie Webster brought suit to compel consideration for accreditation
without regard to the school's proprietary nature.94 The D.C. Circuit
Court, however, held that the refusal to accredit was not a commercial
activity under the Sherman Act.95
In examining the accreditation system, the Marjorie Webster court
stated that the Sherman Act did not extend to "noncommercial aspects
of the liberal arts."96 The court focused on the intent of the MSA, ex-
plaining, "an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to
affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to war-
rant application of the antitrust laws." 97 The court's decision, therefore,
rested on the fact that the MSA did not intend to affect commerce.
The Marjorie Webster approach, however, does not require that courts
focus on intent in all situations. As the Third Circuit noted in United
States v. Brown University,98 "[t]he Marjorie Webster court focused pri-
marily on intent because the nature of the conduct in that case was dis-
tinctly noncommercial. The MSA received no payment or other benefit
for evaluating institutions and deciding whether to accredit them." 99 No
money was exchanged for services, and no price setting occurred.
Therefore, a two-step analysis is required to determine whether the
Sherman Act applies: (1) is the activity plainly commercial? and (2) if it
is not plainly commercial, was there an intent or purpose to affect com-
merce? If the activity is plainly commercial, then the Sherman Act con-
trols, and the court must examine the reasonableness of the restraint. If
the activity is not plainly commercial, then the court must ask whether
there was any intent or purpose to affect commerce. If such an intent
mercial motive" in order for a college accreditation process to implicate the Sherman
Act).
90. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970). MIT relied "heavily" on Marjorie Webster in its
defense. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 667 (3d Cir. 1993).
91. See Marjorie Webster, 432 F.2d at 654.
92. See id. at 652.
93. Id. at 652-53.
94. See id. at 653.
95. See id. at 654-55.
96. See id. at 654.
97. See id.
98. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 667.
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existed, then the Sherman Act governs, and the court must examine the
reasonableness of the restraint. If there was no intent or purpose to affect
commerce, the activity is not regulated by the Sherman Act, and there-
fore, there is no violation.
III. THE OVERLAP GROUP, COMMERCE, AND UNITED STATES V.
BROWN UNIVERSrTY
Consistent with this two-step analysis, courts must first examine
whether the overlap group's financial aid activities are plainly commer-
cial. Then, if the activities are not plainly commercial, courts must con-
sider the intent or purpose of the overlap agreement.
A. Is the Nature of the Overlap Group's Conduct
Plainly Commercial?
The Third Circuit in United States v. Brown University" ° equated fi-
nancial aid policies to the calculation of tuition.' Determining base tui-
tion and offering financial aid, however, are distinct practices. While
tuition is calculated according to the cost to educate the student, 0 2 finan-
cial aid is determined by an individual's financial need. 3
1. The Relationship Between Tuition and Financial Aid
Overlap group colleges set their tuition according to the college's cost
to educate the student."m The base tuition of colleges in the overlap
group, in fact, is lower than the actual cost to educate the student.1 5 In
addition to the lower price which all students receive, the colleges offer
gifts to incoming students, generally in the form of grants or low-cost
loans. 106
The overlap group decided to allocate its limited resources solely on
the basis of a student's financial need.'07 To determine this need, they
agreed on a formula and met annually to insure that jointly admitted
students received similar financial aid awards. 08 As a corollary to this
agreement, the colleges agreed not to consider a student's financial ability
to pay in admission decisions. 'I Therefore, they would not deny admis-
100. 5 F.3d 658 (3rd Cir. 1993).
101. See id at 666.
102. See id at 682 (Veis, J., dissenting).
103. See id at 662.
104. See id at 682 (Weis, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 666; Carol Jouzaitis, MIT Insists Student Aid Plan Not Fee FKx, Hous.
Chron., July 12, 1992, at A2.
106. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 681 (Veis, J., dissenting).
107. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 662; DePalma, supra note 8, at A17; Yoder, supra note 7, at
A23.
108. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 662-63; DePalma, supra note 8, at A17.
109. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 682 (Veis, J., dissenting) ("As a part of their perceived
responsibility to society, MIT and the other Ivy League schools adopted a policy of ad-
mitting students based on academic, and not financial, ability."). Furthermore, it is cer-
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sion to a borderline student who could make only a small monetary con-
tribution to her tuition. 1 °
The Third Circuit examined whether the overlap group's actions
should be considered plainly commercial under the Sherman Act."'I
Judge Robert E. Cowen, writing for the majority, focused on the rela-
tionship between financial aid and tuition. "12 Financial aid exists only in
relation to tuition. As the court pointed out, a student is not free to take
a financial aid award and apply it to another college.' 13 Thus, Judge
Cowen reasoned, financial aid is a "discount" on the cost of tuition, and
therefore is plainly commercial: "The amount of financial aid not only
impacts, but directly determines the amount that a needy student must
pay to receive an education at MIT. The financial aid therefore is part of
the commercial process of setting tuition."' 14
When viewed in this fashion, financial aid does appear to be used as a
tool in commerce; however, this naked picture of financial aid belies the
nature of the financial aid system and ignores the purposes of the Sher-
man Act. Calculating tuition and determining financial aid are distinct
functions. Tuition is set according to the expense of operating the insti-
tution-the cost to educate the student.' Financial aid, on the other
hand, is determined according to a student's financial need." 6 It is not
calculated as a discount to the normal cost, the way a loaf of bread, for
example, might be discounted. A company discounts bread for a variety
of reasons, but ultimately its objective is to increase profits, not to fulfill a
perceived responsibility to society.'
Imagine, if possible, that bread-makers decide that they have an obli-
gation to feed the hungry. In furtherance of that goal, they institute a
price structure to allow the destitute to pay for the bread according to
their financial assets. Assuming no one pays more than cost, would such
an agreement be considered a violation of the Sherman Act? Attacking
such an arrangement would certainly be an unnecessarily wooden appli-
cation of the law. 818
tainly unusual and unbusiness-like for an entity to sell its services to people who do not
have the money to pay, when others who can pay are in great supply.
110. As the dissent in Brown pointed out: "The record demonstrates that MIT re-
ceives over three times as many applications as it can accept and that it could fill its
classrooms with students who are able to pay the full base tuition." Id. (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
111. See id. at 665-68.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 666.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 682 (Weis, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 662.
117. See id. at 682 (Weis, J., dissenting).
118. As the Supreme Court stated in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940),
"we are not relegated to so mechanical an application of these cryptic phrases in the
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, for the Court has since so interpreted them as
to give to the phrase 'restraint of trade or commerce' a meaning and content consonant
with the legislative and judicial history of the Act .... Id. at 509-510.
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Similarly, the overlap group, as noted by Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., in
his dissenting opinion, is not "compelled nor advised by business consid-
erations, but only serves commendable social objectives."' 9 The overlap
group has instituted a system which makes it possible for all qualified
students, regardless of financial position, to attend the member col-
leges.1 20 At the same time, no student pays more than cost. Such a sys-
tem simply does not restrain commerce. Rather, it aids those students
who cannot afford the tuition.
2. The Benefit to the Overlap Group
Judge Cowen's opinion in Brown emphasized that MIT benefits from
providing financial aid. 12 1 Judge Cowen noted that by distributing aid,
MIT enables exceptional students who otherwise could not afford the
tuition to attend.1" He then stated that "[t]he resulting expansion in
MIT's pool of exceptional applicants increases the quality of MIT's stu-
dent body. MIT then enjoys enhanced prestige by virtue of its ability to
attract a greater portion of the 'cream of the crop.' ,123 This conclusion,
however, is unsupported.
First, the record does not support the assumption that the financial aid
program enhances MIT's institutional prestige. MIT has long been a col-
lege of rich tradition and prestige.1 24 Need-based financial aid is not
likely to attract students sufficiently to enhance the college's reputa-
tion.12 5 Rather, MIT could better attract the most qualified students by
giving them full scholarships, regardless of need, and then filling the rest
of the class with the many capable applicants who can afford to pay full
tuition. MIT would thus get the "best and the brightest" by diverting all
financial aid to the best qualified applicants, depriving only low-income
students.
Second, though the school benefits by enabling exceptional students to
attend, the financial aid program benefits society more than it promotes
119. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 683 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
120. The overlap system, known as the "Ivy Methodology," in fact, is quite similar to
the federal system of disbursing financial aid, known as the "Congressional Methodol-
ogy." See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-99 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Though the Ivy Methodology
generally results in less generous aid packages than under the Congressional Methodol-
ogy, see Brown, 5 F.3d at 663, both methods focus solely on financial need, not on aca-
demic or other merit. See id at 662 (discussing the Congressional and Ivy methods as
determining aid based on "family assets" and "demonstrated need," respectively).
121. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 666-67.
122. See id at 667.
123. Id
124. MIT was founded in 1861 and currently has an operating budget of S1.1 billion
and an endowment of $1.5 billion. See id. at 661. Its governing body is comprised of
"distinguished leaders in science, engineering, industry, education and public service."
Id
125. Judge Weis notes in his dissent: "The students are the recipients of largesse, and
any contribution they make in return has not been substantiated. No quid pro quo of
substance exists." Id at 684 (Weis, J., dissenting).
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the college itself. The low-income applicants and society benefit from
allowing a greater number of low-income applicants to participate in
higher education. Economic diversity is increased and students from
low-income backgrounds are educated. This benefit outweighs the ad-
vantage to MIT of admitting an only slightly more qualified student with
significantly less financial resources.
Further, as the Brown dissent points out, "[t]he funds that are
earmarked for student aid could instead be used to increase salaries as a
means of attracting the very finest faculty." 12 6 Faculty reputation vitally
contributes to a college's prestige and attractiveness.' 27 Likewise, com-
puters, housing, libraries, and other aspects of the college that require
funding affect the college's reputation.
Moreover, alumni and philanthropists donate money to colleges,
among other reasons, to allow students who cannot otherwise afford the
tuition to matriculate.128 If the money were funneled through a church
organization, for example, instead of through a college, it would certainly
be considered charity.129 In both situations, granting money to aid in
tuition payment is a donation, not a commercial discount in price.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests that
Congress did not intend for the Act to reach social causes.' 30  The
Supreme Court in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader' pointed out that the
history of the Sherman Act emphatically supports the conclusion that
"'business competition' was the problem considered and that the act was
designed to prevent restraints of trade which had a significant effect on
such competition." '32 The debates prior to the passing of the Sherman
Act confirm that the Act was not intended to reach the activities of orga-
nizations embracing social causes.1 33
Although setting tuition is regulated by the Sherman Act, financial aid
is not. Offering financial aid and calculating tuition are distinct prac-
126. Id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
127. See id. (Weis, J., dissenting).
128. See Anthony DePalma, Maxwell to Donate $10 Million to Polytechnic U., N.Y.
Times, Sept. 18, 1991, at D 17; George Judson, Yale Sets Goal of $1.5 Billion in 5-Year
Fund-raising Drive, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1992, § 1, at 46.
129. Judge Weis, in his dissenting opinion in Brown, pointed out that under the federal
tax code, university-funded aid is "undoubtedly charitable." See Brown, 5 F.3d at 683
(Weis, J., dissenting).
130. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2658-59 (1890) (statement of Senator Sherman). Senator Sher-
man stated:
I do not see any reason for putting in temperance societies [as a special excep-
tion] any more than churches or school-houses or any other kind of moral or
educational associations that may be organized. Such an association is not in
any sense a combination or arrangement made to interfere with interstate com-
merce .... You might as well include churches and Sunday schools.
Id.
131. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
132. Id. at 493 n.15.
133. See NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing 20 Cong. Rec.
1458-59 (1889)).
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tices. Determining tuition is a business decision akin to setting the price
for bread. Each is a market determination of how much the commodity
is worth. In contrast, the amount of aid to be given away is a social
decision in the same way that the amount of discounted bread to be given
away to the destitute is a social decision that bread-makers are free to
determine. Calculating financial aid is not a business decision, but rather
a social determination that aid should be based solely on need. There-
fore, need-based financial aid is not a plainly commercial activity under
the Sherman Act.
B. Was There Any Intent or Purpose to Affect Commerce?
Since awarding financial aid is not a plainly commercial activity, the
overlap group violated the Sherman Act only if it intended to affect com-
merce.13 4 The overlap agreement established a financial aid formula to
determine economic assistance solely on a prospective student's financial
need.135 This practice would allow all qualified students to attend re-
gardless of their ability to pay.136 This reflects a social policy decision-
equity requires that financial aid decisions be based on financial need.
Admittedly, this policy affects an applicant's decision by eliminating one
factor, the amount of financial aid, from the process. However, this ef-
fect is incidental to the overlap group's equitable allocation of its gifts.'
37
When the effect on commerce is only an incidental result of a valid
social objective, the Sherman Act is not implicated. 3 For example, the
Eighth Circuit, in Missouri v. NOW 9 recognized that organizations may
unintentionally affect commerce."4 In Missouri v. NOW, the State of
Missouri brought an action against NOW alleging that NOW's campaign
for a convention boycott' 4 ' of states which had not ratified the Equal
Rights Amendment constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade under
134. See supra part II.B.
135. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 682 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dis-
senting); DePalma, supra note 8, at A17; Yoder, supra note 7, at A23.
136. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 682 (Weis, J., dissenting). Judge Weis further points out
[a]s a result of these policies, the record demonstrates that the number of stu-
dents from minority groups and non-affluent families who attend MIT has in-
creased dramatically in recent years. The government does not challenge the
societal good that flows from these need-blind admission and need-based aid
policies. Indeed, financial aid made available by the government is aimed at the
very same objective.
Id. at 682-83 (citing Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1 146a).
137. If agreeing to base aid solely on need is a violation, then should we force the
colleges to give athletic scholarships? Band Scholarships? Drama scholarships?
138. See, eg., NOW v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 620-23 (7th Cir. 1992) (illegal conduct
which had an economic impact on abortion clinics is not prohibited by the Sherman Act);
Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1315-16 (8th Cir. 1980) (boycott of Missouri conven-
tions by the National Organization for Women is not a Sherman Act violation despite its
adverse economic impact).
139. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
140. See id at 1315.
141. NOW engaged in an "economic boycott campaign," refusing to hold their con-
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the Sherman Act. 142 The Eighth Circuit, recognizing that Missouri was
injured by NOW's campaign, nonetheless held that NOW did not violate
the Sherman Act: "the finding by the district court .. .that NOW's
campaign was intended to and did in fact injure Missouri in its relation-
ship with its convention customers can mean no more than that Missouri
sustained a direct injury as an incidental effect of NOW's campaign to
influence governmental action." '143 Therefore, NOW did not violate the
Sherman Act.'"
Similarly, the purpose of the overlap agreement is not to injure the
student or to affect interstate commerce, but rather to allocate the col-
leges' charitable resources in the fairest way possible. The overlap group
is comprised of nonprofit organizations which, like the nonprofit accred-
iting institutions in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools,1 45 sought neither to affect com-
merce nor to injure any student, but rather to develop the quality of the
institutions in the fairest way possible.1 46 Any injury to a prospective
student by the overlap agreement is unintentional and incidental to the
socially commendable goal of providing aid to all students who need it.
The overlap group's financial aid policy is not plainly commercial,1 47 and
the overlap group did not evidence any intent to affect commerce.148
Therefore, the overlap agreement does not violate the Sherman Act.
IV. JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING AN "UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINT OF TRADE:" WHICH STANDARD APPLIES?
Even if the financial aid policy of the overlap group is considered com-
mercial, the policy is justified under the rule of reason standard. 149 Ap-
plication of the per se and quick look standards is inappropriate because
of the overlap agreement's unique characteristics. Furthermore, the pro-
competitive features of the agreement make the restraint reasonable.
ventions in states which had not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment. See id. at 1302-
03.
142. See id. at 1302.
143. Id. at 1315 (second emphasis added).
144. See id. at 1315-16.
145. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970). For a detailed discussion of the Marjorie Webster
decision, see supra part II.B.
146. See id. at 652; United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661-62 (3d Cir. 1993).
The Brown court stated:
Although MIT could fill its entire entering class with students able to pay the
full tuition, it utilizes a need-blind admissions system under which all admission
decisions are based entirely on merit without consideration of an applicant's
ability to pay tuition .... To provide admitted needy students with a realistic
opportunity to enroll, MIT also is committed to satisfying the full financial aid
needs of its student body.
Id.
147. See supra part III.A.
148. See supra part III.B.
149. For a discussion of the rule of reason standard generally, see supra part I.B.3.
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A. Applying the Per Se Approach
The overlap agreement's distinctive characteristics make the applica-
tion of the per se standard inappropriate.1 5' First, the overlap agree-
ment's object is not to maximize profits, but rather to benefit society.
The Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 5' cautioned
against applying traditional antitrust concepts outside of conventional
business activities. The court noted that the "public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently." 152
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 153 for example, the
Supreme Court applied the per se standard to two county medical socie-
ties that set maximum fee-schedules for medical services." The Court
emphasized, however, that "[tihe price-fixing agreements in this case...
are not premised on public service or ethical norms."' 55 This distinction
plays an important role in the analysis. Price-fixing arrangements pre-
mised on profit-maximization clearly violate the Sherman Act.156 Agree-
ments based on ethical norms, however, require closer scrutiny to
determine if the Act is violated.' 57 Thus, the public service nature of the
overlap agreement makes the application of the per se standard
inappropriate.
In addition, the overlap group modeled its financial aid system after
the federal government's system of financial aid.'5 8 Both systems base
aid solely on need, rather than on academic or other merit.' 59 Both sys-
tems also set up a formula for determining a student's need to ensure that
similarly situated students are treated equally regardless of the individual
college.160 This suggests that the overlap group's policy, which in theory
mimics the federal system, deserves more than cursory scrutiny. 16 1
150. For a discussion of the unique characteristics of the overlap group which make
application of the per se standard inappropriate, see Donald R. Carlson & George B.
Shepherd, Cartel On Campus: The Economics and Law of Academic Institutions' Finan-
cial Aid Price-Fixing, 71 Or. L. Rev. 563, 614-17 (1992). For a discussion of the per se
standard generally, see supra part I.B.I.
151. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
152. Id at 788-89 n.17. See also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-
59 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has been "slow" to condemn rules adopted by
professional associations as per se unlawful).
153. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
154. See id at 348-49.
155. Id. at 349.
156. See id. at 348-49.
157. See id
158. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1099 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Congress further approved
the concept of need-blind admissions and agreement among schools on general principles
for determining student aid in the Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-325, § 1544, 106 Stat. 448, 837 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1088 (Supp. IV 1992)).
159. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-1(a)(2).
160. See United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 291-93 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
161. See Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 150, at 616.
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Furthermore, the economic impact of the overlap agreement is un-
clear. As the Supreme Court stated in FTC v. Indiana Federation of
Dentists, 162 "we have been slow . . . to extend per se analysis to ...
business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is
not immediately obvious."1 63 No definitive evidence exists that the over-
lap agreement had any effect on the price of education at overlap col-
leges." The per se standard, therefore, should not be applied to the
overlap agreement.
B. Applying the Quick Look Approach
The quick look approach should only be applied in situations where
anticompetitive behavior, such as higher price and output reduction, is
readily apparent.' 65 The district court in United States v. Brown Univer-
sity16 6 applied the quick look standard. 67 The Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the quick look standard should not be applied to the overlap
agreement because of the "nature of higher education" and pro-competi-
tive and pro-consumer features of the overlap agreement.'
68
The Supreme Court has previously applied the quick look standard to
an agreement among colleges. In NCAA v. Board of Regents,169 the
Court applied the quick look standard to a television broadcast agree-
ment among colleges. 170 The NCAA, in an attempt to limit adverse ef-
fects on attendance and to spread the participation in televised football
games among as many universities as possible, limited the number of
football games any one school could televise.' 7 ' The Supreme Court de-
clined to mandate the rule of reason analysis because the district court
found that the agreement actually increased prices and restricted
output. 172
According to the Court, "[T]hese hallmarks of anticompetitive behav-
ior place upon [the NCAA] a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative
162. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
163. Id. at 458-59 (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979)).
164. In a laborious study of the overlap agreement, Professors Donald R. Carlson and
George B. Shepherd concluded that the economic impacts were "not obvious," calling
the effect of the agreement "intricate and sometimes counterintuitive." See Carlson &
Shepherd, supra note 150, at 616.
165. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984) (applying a truncated
rule of reason standard, though not labeling it the "quick look").
166. 805 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd, 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
167. United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 664 (3d Cir. 1993) (analyzing the pro-
ceedings below).
168. See id. at 678. For a discussion of the quick look standard generally, see supra
part I.B.2.
169. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
170. See id. at 91-92 (applying a truncated rule of reason analysis though not employ-
ing the term "quick look").
171. See id.
172. See id. at 107 ("Price is higher and output lower than they would otherwise be,
and both are unresponsive to consumer preference.").
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defense .... ,,3 Such "hallmarks" of anticompetitive behavior do not
exist in the overlap case. No evidence suggests that the overlap agree-
ment has caused or is likely to cause output reduction-enrollment has
not declined.174 Nor has it been determined whether the overlap agree-
ment affects the price of education at member colleges. 175
Furthermore, the distinctive characteristics that make per se analysis
inapplicable 176 also make application of the quick look approach inap-
propriate. The overlap group has offered sound justifications for its prac-
tices. 17 7 The overlap agreement allows the schools to fulfill the socially
desirable goal of providing all needy students with financial aid. 178
Therefore, the quick look presumption of competitive harm does not
apply.
C. Applying the Rule of Reason Approach
Since both the per se and quick look standards do not apply, the over-
lap agreement must be analyzed under the rule of reason standard.
179
The rule of reason analysis is limited to examining the agreement's effect
on competition. 180 Thus, social justifications, such as aiding minorities,
are not considered when determining the reasonableness of the re-
straint.'81 The overlap agreement's pro-competitive characteristics,
however, make the agreement lawful.
The overlap agreement does not diminish the colleges' incentive to
keep costs down and preserve its resources. Antitrust law is based on the
belief that, through competition, producers will strive to satisfy the con-
sumer's wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest re-
sources.' 82 Eliminating competition based on financial aid, however,
does not eliminate the overlap colleges' desire to save resources. The
disbursement of financial aid is markedly different from the setting of
price in a market economy. For example, when bread-makers fix the
price of bread, little incentive exists to conserve resources or keep costs
down, since they are happily making a profit with no worry of competi-
tion. In contrast, when a college offers aid, it is actually taking money
out of a fund and using it to pay that student's tuition. Even though
competition among schools based on aid is eliminated, the college still
173. Id at 113 (emphasis added).
174. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 674 (3d Cir. 1993).
175. See id
176. See supra part IV.A.
177. See id
178. See Parloff, supra note 13, at 78.
179. See supra part IV.A-B.
180. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) ("Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any
argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason.
Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive condi-
tions."). For a discussion of the rule of reason generally, see supra part I.B.3.
181. See id
182. See Sullivan, supra note 40, at 2-3.
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takes money out of its assets that it could use elsewhere. Since the col-
lege diminishes its resources by giving need-based financial aid, it still has
an incentive to keep its costs down, thereby preserving its resources.
In addition, although the overlap agreement eliminates competition
for students based on price, the agreement has other pro-competitive ef-
fects. Antitrust purists argue that competition is the best method for
allocating resources and will ultimately produce "not only lower prices,
but also better goods and services." ' 3 The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized that the Sherman Act does not sanction a blind adherence to
competition. Rather, the Sherman Act accepts certain arrangements
which are "designed to increase economic efficiency and render markets
more, rather than less, competitive. '84 The Third Circuit recognized
this and thus remanded the case to the district court for consideration of
the overlap agreement's pro-competitive effects. 8 5
The overlap agreement has two important pro-competitive effects that
the district court failed to fully consider. First, it improves the quality of
education at schools.'86 The Supreme Court has recognized improve-
ment in the quality of a service that enhances the public's desire for that
service as one possible pro-competitive virtue.8 7 The district court in
Brown noted that it cannot be denied that "cultural and economic diver-
sity contributes to the quality of education and enhances the vitality of
campus life."' 88 Cultural and economic diversity has increased consider-
ably as a result of the overlap agreement, therefore increasing the quality
of the service.' 89
Second, the overlap agreement increases consumer choice by making
education more accessible to a greater number of students. Enhance-
ment of consumer choice is a traditional objective of antitrust law and
has also been acknowledged as a pro-competitive benefit.19' As a result
of the overlap agreement, available resources are spread among more
needy students than would be the case if some students received aid in
183. Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695; accord Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231, 248 (1951) ("The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the
value of competition.").
184. Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 295 (1985) (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979)); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978) (substantially the
same quote); accord Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933)
("The mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition between them-
selves is not enough to condemn it."). For a discussion of the overlap agreement and its
relationship to competition written prior to the Third Circuit decision in United States v.
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (1993), see Selwyn, supra note 85, at 156-62.
185. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 674, 678.
186. See id. at 674.
187. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114-15 (1984).
188. United States v. Brown Univ., 805 F. Supp. 288, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev'd, 5
F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
189. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 682 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J.,
dissenting).
190. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102; Brown, 5 F.3d at 675.
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excess of need. 91 The overlap system maximizes the number of students
able to afford an education at an overlap member college.' 9 2 Removing
financial obstacles for the greatest number of talented but needy students
increases students' access to the colleges, thereby widening consumer
choice.
In addition to its pro-competitive effects, the overlap agreement avoids
the great enemy of antitrust analysis--output reduction. In Senator
Sherman's speeches during debate on the Sherman Act, 193 in treatises, 94
in articles, 95 and in most relevant Supreme Court opinions, 9 6 output
reduction is considered the "paradigm inefficiency."'19 With the overlap
agreement in place, however, there has been no such negative effect. As
tuition increased over the last thirty-four years, enrollment has not de-
clined. 9 Therefore, the overlap agreement does not restrict output.
Given the overlap agreement's pro-competitive features and its failure
to cause output reduction, the primary evil attacked by the Sherman Act,
the overlap agreement passes the rule of reason test and thus does not
violate the Sherman Act.
CONCLUSION
After a two-year investigation and two-and-one-half years of litigation,
MIT and the overlap agreement are back where they started. The settle-
ment between the Justice Department and MIT validates the majority of
the overlap group's policies, only prohibiting the discussion of individual
aid awards.19 9 Antitrust law, however, is not back where it started. In-
stead, the Third Circuit has expanded the scope of Section I of the Sher-
man Act beyond the intent of the framers and the opinions of the
Supreme Court.
The overlap agreement is an attempt by the member colleges to dis-
tribute their limited funds in the fairest way possible. The overlap col-
leges are private institutions which have no legal obligation to provide
191. See Brown, 5 F.3d at 675.
192. See id
193. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890).
194. See Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application 1511 (1986).
195. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers at the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 88, 92-93 (1982);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Anti-
trust Analysis, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 685, 719 (1991).
196. See, eg., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-15 (1984) (analyzing the
effect on output of an agreement among colleges to limit the number of games each col-
lege would televise).
197. See Carlson & Shepherd, supra note 150, at 622.
198. See id. For example, in 1989 enrollment was 993, in 1985 enrollment was 1061, in
1983 enrollment was 1075, and in 1981 enrollment was 1031. See Barron's Profiles of
American Colleges 482 (17th ed. 1990); id at 417 (15th ed. 1986); id. at 415 (14th ed.
1984); id at 367 (13th ed. 1982).
199. For a review of the settlement, see supra note 2.
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financial assistance. Nonetheless, the colleges offer grants and low-cost
loans so that all admitted students, regardless of their financial circum-
stances, can attend. This beneficence does not resemble the manipulative
"trusts and combinations" which Senator Sherman attacked." ° Nor do
these social policies resemble the endeavor of a business league which
sets a minimum price for services in order to inflate profits.20 Like the
bread-makers that help feed the hungry, the overlap group gives aid to
the people who need it. The Sherman Act does not prohibit that.
200. See Earl W. Kintner, The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and
Related Statutes 112-14 (1978); see also, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
492-93 (1940) ("[The Sherman Act] was enacted in the era of 'trusts' and 'combinations'
of businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppres-
sion of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of
which had become a matter of public concern.").
201. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776-78 (1975).
